83 research outputs found
On Seeming to Remember
Philosophers and psychologists often distinguish episodic or personal memory
from propositional or semantic memory. A vexed issue concerns the role,
if any, of memory “impressions” or “seemings” within the latter. According
to an important family of approaches, seemings play a fundamental epistemological
role vis-à -vis propositional memory judgments: it is one’s memory
seeming that Caesar was murdered, say, that justifies one’s judgment that he
was murdered. Yet, it has been convincingly argued that these approaches
lead to insurmountable problems and that memory seemings are not wellsuited
to play this justifying role. As a result, many contemporary accounts
of propositional memory dispense with these seemings altogether. Is the idea
that memory seemings play a key role in propositional memory really the
result of bad theorizing? My aim is to shed light on this issue, which I will
approach as follows.
In Section 1, I contrast episodic memory with propositional memory so
as to clarify the nature of the latter. According to the account I put forward,
episodic memory consists in the preservation of acquaintance with objects
and events, whereas propositional memory consists in the preservation of
thought contents. In Section 2, I turn my attention to the contrast between
propositional memory contents and propositional memory as an attitude.
I argue that they play different roles. Memory contents satisfy a past awareness
constraint and a causal constraint; the attitude of remembering explains
why we are inclined to endorse these contents. This distinction leads
me to explore the attitude of remembering, and I argue, in Section 3, that
the most appealing account of this attitude is in terms of feelings of familiarity.
In Section 4, I turn my attention to the epistemology of propositional
memory and revisit the claim that propositional memory judgments are
justifi ed by memory seemings. In so doing, I contend that the attitude of
remembering plays an exclusively explanatory role and does not contribute
to the epistemology of propositional memory judgments. I conclude by
drawing a more general lesson regarding the respective roles of attitudes
and contents
The Phenomenology of Memory
The most salient aspect of memory is its role in preserving previously acquired information so as to make it available for further activities. Anna realizes that something is amiss in a book on Roman history because she learned and remembers that Caesar was murdered. Max turned up at the party and distinctively remembers where he was seated, so he easily gets his hands on his lost cell phone. The fact that information is not gained anew distinguishes memory from perception. The fact that information is preserved distinguishes memory from imagination. But how do acquisition and retrieval of information contribute to the phenomenology of memory?The exclusive aim of this chapter is to sketch a map of the phenomenology of memory. It is structured as follows. In section 1, I introduce the contrast between content (what is remembered) and psychological attitude (remembering). This distinction will be helpful in disentangling issues in the phenomenology of memory. Section 2 is devoted to the contribution of memory content to phenomenology, section 3 to the contribution of the attitude of remembering
Valence, Bodily (Dis)Pleasures and Emotions
Bodily (dis)pleasures and emotions share the striking property of being valenced, i.e. they are positive or negative. What is valence? How do bodily (dis)pleasures and emotions relate to one another? This chapter assesses the prospects of two popular theses regarding the relation between bodily (dis)pleasures and emotions in light of what we can reasonably think about valence. According to the first thesis, the valence of bodily (dis)pleasures is explanatory prior vis-Ă -vis the valence of emotions. According to the second, emotions contain bodily (dis)pleasures. I argue that bodily (dis)pleasures are intentional states whose valence is to be understood in terms of evaluative experience, and bring to light the similarities and dissimilarities between their intentional structure and that of emotions. On this backdrop, I offer reasons to conclude that we should adopt neither of the two theses
Emotions and Memory
Pre-theoretically, it seems obvious that there are deep and multifarious relations between memory and emotions. On the one hand, a large chunk of our affective lives concerns the good and bad events that happened to us and that we preserve in memory. This is one amongst the many ways in which memory is relevant to the nature and causation of emotions. What does recent research teach us about these relations? § 1 surveys some key issues in this regard. On the other hand, which events we happen to preserve in memory very much depends on how we affectively reacted to them when they took place. Emotions are relevant to the nature and causation of memory in this and many other ways. Key issues regarding these relations are surveyed in § 2
From Justified Emotions to Justified Evaluative Judgements
ABSTRACT: Are there justified emotions? Can they justify evaluative judgements? We first explain the need for an account of justified emotions by emphasizing that emotions are states for which we have or lack reasons. We then observe that emotions are explained by their cognitive and motivational bases. Considering cognitive bases first, we argue that an emotion is justified if and only if the properties the subject is aware of constitute an instance of the relevant evaluative property. We then investigate the roles of motivational bases. Finally, we argue that justified emotions are sufficient for justified evaluative judgement
Le paradoxe de la fiction: le retour
Tullmann et Buckwalter (2014) ont récemment soutenu que le paradoxe de la fiction tenait plus de l’illusion que de la réalité. D’après eux, les théories contemporaines des émotions ne fourniraient aucune raison d’adopter une interprétation du terme « existence » qui rende les prémisses du paradoxe incompatibles entre elles. Notre discussion a pour but de contester cette manière de dissoudre le paradoxe de la fiction en montrant qu’il ne prend pas sa source dans les théories contemporaines des émotions. Bien plutôt, son origine se situe dans ce que Radford (1975) décrit comme une incohérence dans nos réactions émotionnelles aux évènements fictionnels et non fictionnels. Malgré ce désaccord, nous concédons à Tullmann et Buckwalter qu’une solution satisfaisante au paradoxe de la fiction doit s’appuyer sur les théories des émotions. Ainsi, en guise de conclusion, nous expliquons comment il convient de comprendre l’incohérence en question et comment les théories des émotions pourraient contribuer à la résolution du paradoxe de la fiction
Emotions: Philosophical Issues About
We start this overview by discussing the place of emotions within the broader affective domain – how different are emotions from moods, sensations and affective dispositions? Next, we examine the way emotions relate to their objects, emphasizing in the process their intimate relations to values. We move from this inquiry into the nature of emotion to an inquiry into their epistemology. Do they provide reasons for evaluative judgements and, more generally, do they contribute to our knowledge of values? We then address the question of the social dimension of emotions, explaining how the traditional nature vs. nurture contrast applies to the emotions. We finish by exploring the relations between emotions, motivation and action, concluding this overview with a more specific focus on how these relations bear on some central ethical issues
L’intentionnalité des émotions : du corps aux valeurs
Lorsque l’on considère les émotions indépendamment de toute entreprise théorique, deux constats s’imposent. D’un côté, les émotions possèdent une dimension phénoménale ou expérientielle : il y a un « effet que cela fait » que de ressentir une émotion, et cet effet se manifeste de manière particulièrement saillante dans la conscience des perturbations physiologiques propre aux expériences émotionnelles fortes. De l’autre, les émotions nous mettent en lien avec notre environnement et plus spéci..
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